Introduction
challenges of acquiring WMD, such as discovery of a state actor's cache of chemical or biological weapons. For example, roadside bombs used against US forces in Iraq in 2003 contained Iraqi-produced chemical weapons abandoned after the Iran-Iraq war two decades earlier. 4 The challenges WMD pose for non-state actors suggest that factors different from those associated with conventional weapons are likely to affect consideration of WMD as part of a terrorist group's strategy. As advances in science and technology further reduce obstacles to successful execution of a WMD attack, it is increasingly important to understand why a group would commit to acquisition or production and use of WMD and what indicators would signal movement toward such a commitment.
Chemical and biological weapons are sufficiently different from radiological and nuclear weapons to warrant separate analysis. For example, compared with radiological and nuclear devices or weapons, chemical and biological agents and weapons are easier to conceal, the materials needed to produce them are relatively easier to acquire, and a chemical or biological weapons (CBW) program requires less financing and expertise to establish. 5 The knowledge required to perform biological and chemical science also shares more in common than that required for radiological and nuclear science, which may have implications for recruitment and efficient application of expertise. Like radiological or nuclear weapons, even low concentrations of CBW can create panic and fear. 6 However, because discovery of a chemical, biological, or radiological attack may not occur immediately, heightened panic and fear about the spread of the agent or material can ensue. 7 Previous analyses of attempts to acquire or use CBW-while useful-have not resulted in a practical framework to identify indicators that a group may present a high risk for acquiring and using CBW. 8 This article presents a framework for CBW intent-a CBW Intent Model.
Previous Use of CBW by Individuals and Groups
Chemical or biological weapons are not a recent phenomenon. As early as 1000 BC, the Chinese used arsenic smoke against enemies. Both World Wars saw experimentation and use of chemical and biological weapons (for example, WWI: Germany's use of anthrax to infect Russian horses, chlorine and mustard gas use by Germany early in the war and by Britain late in the war; WWII: Japan's experimentation with and use of cholera and other biological agents against Chinese cities). 9 With few exceptions, CBW also are generally not the sole weapon considered by a group. Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic religious sect that released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995, tried unsuccessfully to acquire and manufacture nuclear weapons and researched other weapon technologies such as lasers and microwaves while running chemical and biological weapons programs. 10 The arsenals of armed militia groups in the United States have included both conventional weapons (for example, assault rifles and bombs) and CBW (ricin by the Minnesota Patriots Council; potassium cyanide by The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord). 11 Attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have included chlorine gas and mustard gas as well as advanced conventional weapons (for example, assault rifles, surface-to-surface rockets, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guided weapons). 12 CBW are also often instrumental to achieving specific objectives for which they are especially well-suited, such as targeting individuals or debilitating but not necessarily killing victims. They have been used for both political and criminal purposes. For example, ISIS used CW to slow down and demoralize Iraqi forces advancing on Mosul, the Rajneeshees contaminated food at several restaurants to affect the outcome of a local election, VX agent was used to murder Kim Jong-Nam, a disgruntled employee poisoned the food of his co-workers, and ricin was used to murder a Bulgarian and in an attempt by an individual to poison a spouse in a child custody battle. 13 Although individuals have perpetrated many of the documented attacks using chemical or biological (CB) agents, groups are the focus of the model. So-called lone wolf attacks are more likely to have a criminal purpose such as extortion or revenge and be one-time events. 14 Groups are more likely to have access to the resources needed to develop an organic CB capability. Because groups have at least two members, there are also more opportunities to observe indicators or trip wires such as expertise of group members, intercept communications, or infiltrate the group. 15 (1985) 
Development of the Model
Development of the CBW Intent Model relied on research on terrorism and violence, case studies, reviews of known and suspected use cases, and scientific models of behavior and intent. Reviews of research on terrorism, political and criminal violence, the ideology and dynamics of terrorist groups, radicalization, and group organizational processes that support terrorist operations provided a foundation for understanding the motivations of individuals and groups, and the circumstances associated with terrorism and with attempted and actual use of CBW. 18 Two theories from social and organizational psychology-the Theory of Planned Behavior and Expectancy Theory-inform the model. 19 These theories hold that choice among behavioral alternatives-such as use of violence and type of weapons-is influenced by beliefs related to available behavioral alternatives and the expected consequences of attempting and executing the behaviors. 20 In the Theory of Planned Behavior intention is the immediate precursor of behavior, and intention follows from "beliefs about [a] behavior's likely consequences (perceived outcomes), about normative expectations of important others (social/group norms), and about the presence of factors that control behavioral performance (moderating factors)." 21 In Expectancy Theory, behavior follows from the expectation of reward associated with choices among alternatives. 22 Intent to perform a specific behavior is based on the expectancy (belief) that a level of effort will lead to the intended performance (perceived capability), the perceived instrumentality of the performance to achieve a desired outcome (instrumental to the desired end), and the desirability of the outcome (end state value). 25 The CBW Intent Model incorporates individual influence through group leaders, group dynamics, organizational processes, opportunity, and openness to novel ideas and technology. 26 Knowledge of common factors underlying behavioral choices and terrorist behavior should improve identification of factors unique to the propensity to use violence and unconventional weapons such as CBW. It should also signal when there is increased risk of a non-violent group becoming violent and opting for CBW.
Radicalization is often a key antecedent of terrorism. 27 However, while extreme beliefs may precede violent behavior, not all who hold radical or extremist beliefs will engage in violent behavior or terrorism. 28 The CBW Intent Model does not explicitly include radicalization as a factor, but incorporates several key factors identified as contributing to or indicative of radicalization toward violence. Antecedents common to radicalization and terrorism include humiliation of self or one's group, a personal connection to a grievance, perceived injustice toward the group one identifies with, and dissatisfaction with the status quo of political activism. 29 Overview of the CBW Intent Model
The CBW Intent Model is divided into two sections to distinguish between factors related to intent to use violence (general violence) and factors related to using CB agents or weapons to commit violence (CB violence). Just as not all non-violent groups will become violent, not all violent groups will choose WMD, and specifically CBW, to commit violent acts. However, all groups that use CBW have opted for violence to reach their objectives. While analysts may be less concerned about a previously nonviolent group moving toward violence, they need to distinguish groups moving toward violence using CBW from groups opting for conventional weapons. 30 Ajzen, "The Theory of Planned Behavior," 179-211.
Indicators were selected using a structured process. The initial set of indicators came from CB cases, relevant social science literature, and literature on terrorism and violent extremism. 31 The strength of support for each indicator, its connection to violence or CB violence, and its similarity to other indicators determined the indicator's retention or deletion. The following section describes the indicators associated with general violence and CB violence and the behavioral, organizational, and political constructs supporting each factor. Examples illustrate how the constructs have been observed in or discussed regarding specific, violent groups. A small number of examples are about violent criminal organizations. There are commonalties across violent groups, whether terrorists, gangs, or criminal groups and more is known about the intra-group dynamics of gangs and criminal groups than of terrorist groups. Recognized differences include the importance of ideology and political objectives to terrorist groups and the financial motives attributed to most gangs and criminal groups. 33 General Violence
Groups that have decided to use CBW have already opted for violence as a means to achieve their goals. Hence, the indicators associated with a tendency to engage in violence are necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions for CB violence. It is important to acknowledge that prior acts of violence may not precede the use of CBW and the decision to use violence may occur close in time with the choice of method, especially if serendipity favors a particular method. However, for large-scale attacks, complex operations, or difficult to acquire weapons or technologies, some amount of planning, procuring, and testing prior to an attack would improve the likelihood of success. These pre-attack activities may produce observable signatures of intended violence and the type of violence likely to occur. The composite indicators related to general violence have been associated with group and organizational characteristics, processes, and functioning in general, and with the operations of terrorist, criminal, or political groups that have attempted to achieve their goals through violence.
Leadership Influence: Leadership Influences Group toward Use of Violence
This composite indicator reflects the intentional efforts by influential group members to move the group toward violence. Leader characteristics, goals, beliefs, and group interactions collectively reflect leadership influence on a group. A change in leadership or leadership style may signal a change in the group's direction or activities (for example, toward greater violence). While it may not be possible to assess leadership influence in emerging groups for which little information exists, the model provides a framework for data collection.
Leader's Ability to Impact or Influence Group Members
Attributes that comprise a leader's cognitive abilities, personality, motives and values, problem-solving and social skills, and expertise can provide insights into a leader's potential influence on a group. Groups led by authoritarian or totalitarian leaders are more vulnerable to radical action and violence through polarization and groupthink. 34 
Risk/Benefit Assessment of Violence
The belief that the benefits of terrorism outweigh the risks may result from the perceived instrumentality of terrorism to achieve group ends compared with the instrumentality of other approaches or because of unmet psychological needs of group members. 41 Indicators in this composite have been identified as key factors in radicalization toward violence. They are also interrelated such that the same antecedent factor may be present for multiple indicators.
Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo of Political Activism
This indicator represents the negative affect associated with the perceived ineffectiveness of existing means of political activism. Violent conflict may arise if one or more competing groups perceive they can change the status quo by fighting or do not believe non-violent means will achieve goals. 
Personal Connection to Grievances
Personal grievances or close connections to one's in-group, which has grievances against another group (an out-group), have been identified as factors in radicalization. 49 In several confirmed cases of biological agent use since 1900, the perpetrators were individuals seeking retribution or 43 Stern, "The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1985) ." 44 Tucker, "Lessons from the Case Studies," 260. 45 
Aggression toward the Target Group
Groups may behave aggressively when they perceive another group threatens them. Perceptions of extreme threats and aggression from hostile others may provoke extreme violence in response. 57 The intensity and basis of negative emotions that drive behavior directed toward others will influence a group's predisposition toward violence against them. 58 EXAMPLE: The Christian Identity movement, whose ideology has been associated with justification for hate crimes, refers to Jews as "children of Satan" and blacks as "mud people." 59
Psychological Progression toward Violence
Violence is typically not the primary objective of most political, religious, ethnic, or ideological groups. Rather, a group's acceptance of violence to achieve goals may develop over time and after unsuccessful attempts using non-violent means. Once people believe violence is an acceptable action, the form that violence takes becomes a matter of choice, resources, capabilities, and opportunity, among other factors. Intra-Group Dynamics Intra-group dynamics refers to the behavior and formal and informal processes within a group that influence its structure and functioning. It represents the patterns of stability and change that affect the group's ability to survive and operate effectively. Important processes resulting from intra-group dynamics include the norms that influence member behavior, group cohesiveness, decision making, and group direction usually in the form of group leadership. 62 Intra-group dynamics that support violence are observed in ongoing behavior and activities (for example, whom a group recruits and training provided members) or a change in behavior and activity such as increasingly violent rhetoric or tactics.
Group Norms Support Violence
All groups require mechanisms such as structure and assigned or assumed roles to guide or control member behavior, maintain order, and protect group integrity and survival. Groups create and enforce norms for behaviors that are important to the group and to maintain internal cohesion and the group's relationships with other entities. 63 Norms also help define expected and acceptable behaviors of group members. Cultural and religious norms in particular can facilitate effective group functioning as they define and reinforce acceptable behaviors for group members and express to others what the group believes. 64 EXAMPLE: Justification provided by groups such as ISIS for their violent actions supports both personal and social acceptance of violence as rightful. 65 
In-Group Bias
In-group bias may result when a group's ideology shapes perceptions of others as similar to the group (us or in-group) or dissimilar (them or outgroup) and helps establish and maintain positive self-image and identity. It is evident when one's group takes precedence over others and makes decisions favor of one's in-group. 66 In-group bias may support justification for violence against others (for example, enemies seen as the cause of problems). 67 EXAMPLE: British Muslims recruited by ISIS to fight in Syria believe they will be treated as equals, but often find they and other foreign fighters are disproportionately used as suicide bombers. 68 The Communist Party of India-Maoist emerged from the splintering of several factions of the Leftist movement in India to become one of the country's strongest insurgent groups. 74 The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) created and maintained its "Engineering Department" for weapons R&D. 75 
Closed versus Open Group

Polarization and Choice Shift
Pressure toward uniformity in highly cohesive groups may lead to oversimplification of the decision-making process, intolerance of dissent, and increased vulnerability to polarization. A choice shift is evident when the final opinion or position of the group is different--more positive or negative-from members' initial positions (for example, a historically non-violent group promotes violent means to achieve objectives). 78 Polarization occurs when the shift is in the same direction as members' initial positions-initial positive (or negative) positions are more positive (or negative). 79 Polarization would be evident when a group tending toward violence becomes supportive and accepting of violence. Both types of shifts could signal a progression toward violence.
Deliberations of groups that progress toward violence are difficult to observe. Consequently, it is difficult to track changes from initial stating opinions or positions. However, several of the groups cited throughout this document appear to have operated under conditions conducive to polarization and choice shift.
EXAMPLE: Decision making in Aum Shinrikyo and the Rajneeshees was completely under the control of the group's authoritarian leaders' hierarchical decision-making structure. Both were closed groups that restricted or controlled contact with outsiders, members were generally confined within the group's compound, and leaders experienced time pressures to achieve objectives.
Group Experience with Violence
A "group's collective experience with violence" may emerge from prior involvement of group leaders and members in violent activities and recruitment of individuals experienced in violence. 80 Violent behavior may become the dominant response to a situation if the violence consistently leads to desired outcomes. 81 EXAMPLE: The Real IRA (Irish Republican Army) actively recruited disaffected members from the original IRA who rejected the Good Friday accords and the peace process. 82 Inter-Group Dynamics Underlying all organizational networks are ties that connect network members. These may be formal, instrumental ties for mutual benefit such as leveraging resources or capabilities or informal ties based on shared beliefs, values, interests, or personal relationships. Network connections enable information sharing that would otherwise be difficult to obtain, including innovations in weapons, technology, and tactics. 83 Criminal organizations have historically relied on networks such as family and tribal or community relationships to facilitate their illicit activities.
Criminal groups also develop relationships and marry strategically to gain entry into advantageous groups, networks, and locations to which they might otherwise not have access. 84 Terrorist and violent extremist organizations rely on networks to facilitate their missions. 85 
Alliances/Partnerships
Alliances or partnerships can vary in duration (from short-term tactical or transactional alliances to long-term mergers or strategic alliances), extent of alliance member interdependence, range and variety of activities, ideological similarity, and expected level of trust between members. Bay'ah, or pledge of allegiance to a group's leader by another group, is an example of a high-level connection that may lead to a formal merger. 86 Lower level relationships include instrumental tactical and transactional alliances, which tend to maintain each group's independence, involve limited activities, and not require a shared ideology or high level of trust. 87 Most alliances or partnerships are intentional-or at least convenient-as when groups establish a network to leverage resources or share information. 88 Alliance hubs, which are closely-knit clusters of cooperating organizations, are vehicles for organizational learning and dissemination of innovations among the hub members. 89 For example, dissemination of knowledge can occur through demonstration effects by a network member currently using new weapons technology. 90 Weaker alliance partners may adopt the stronger partner's tactics to improve their effectiveness and range. They may also assume a specialized role that benefits all alliance members (for example, establishing an R&D program or experimenting with new tactics and weapons such as CBW). Afghanistan). 92 They may also contribute to radicalization of each groups' members. 93 Previously non-violent groups may engage in violence and violent groups may explore new tactics or weapons to stand out from their rivals.
EXAMPLE: ISIS propaganda has described rival Islamist groups or anti-ISIS groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and the al Qaida/Nusra Front as apostates and traitors linked to Iraqi Sunni tribal opposition to the Islamic State in Iraq. 94 Organizational Processes
Violent groups and terrorist groups must perform tasks necessary for group maintenance, support, survival, and growth. 95 In addition to attracting and recruiting members, groups must also socialize, train, and retain members, and organize to accomplish its objectives. 96 For example, ISIS has specialized functions to oversee finance, security, media, and recruitment operations. 97 
Staffing and Maintaining the Organization
In addition to recruiting, groups must retain current members who contribute operational expertise, training, capabilities, and understanding of norms and standard operating procedures. A shift in a group's recruitment, training, socialization, and operational tactics may indicate new objectives and an increased risk of violence if the change is consistent with support for violent activities. 98 The rise in status of group members involved in violent attacks may communicate within and outside the group that violence is acceptable and is a means to advancement in leadership ranks.
EXAMPLE: Aum Shinrikyo recruited PhD-level microbiologists and chemists before the group moved toward chemical/biological terrorism. 99 
Member Characteristics
To achieve its objectives, a group must recruit individuals with capabilities commensurate with task requirements or train them. For groups with an interest in or intention to use violence or CBW, attractive recruits will have experience with violence and capabilities and experience related to the weapons and tactics the group wishes to employ (for example, expertise in explosives, chemistry, biology/microbiology, chemical engineering, information technology). Groups may present themselves as legitimate support organizations to build connections with individuals who are vulnerable (for example, because of characteristics or circumstance) and more likely to succumb to persuasion. 100 Vulnerable individuals may also seek out groups for the opportunity to affiliate with peers or individuals with whom they self-identify. 101 EXAMPLES: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham's recruiting strategy targets characteristics specific to its operational needs. For suicide bombing, it targets the homeless, disabled, young, and frustrated refugees. 102 For less expendable and necessary positions, it recruits professionals and university students such as journalists for propaganda work and engineers to run captured industries. 103 
Socialization
Groups may socialize individuals to radical ideologies that facilitate recruitment through social interactions involving family, friends, and others important to the individual who support those ideologies. 105 Once joining a group, new members may undergo secondary socialization to familiarize them with the group's culture, functioning, and structure. 106 EXAMPLES: Almost one-quarter of the members of the Italian Red Brigades and one-third of the 9/11 hijackers were related. 107 Extreme approaches to socialization include the conscription of children to become child soldiers in South Sudan and the kidnapping and impregnation of women by the Shining Path to socialize future soldiers from birth. 108 
Training
Unless a group recruits experienced individuals, some training will be required to prepare new group members for various operations. A change in group strategy from non-violence to violence will require internal or external training in how to destroy property and facilities and how to injure and kill people. 109 EXAMPLE: Hezbollah is known for its sophisticated military training camps, which include firing ranges, assault courses, and urban warfare sites. The camps provide both basic and advanced skills training for recruits and existing members. 110 
Innovation in Weapons and Tactics; Willingness to Take Risks
Group leadership is a key factor in a group's exploration and adoption of unconventional and innovative weapons and tactics. 111 Successful innovations benefit from leadership that is open to experience and information, and willing to take risks that may result in failures. Leader risk taking, however, may be constrained by compatibility of the weapons system with group ideology and values, the group's acceptance of the leader's decision, momentum toward adoption (including sunk costs), sufficient technical expertise to produce or operate new weapons or technologies, opportunity, and access to a safe haven in which to experiment with new weapons or tactics. 112 EXAMPLE: The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) designed and built submersible and reusable narco submarines to overcome improved detection and interdiction of fast boats by authorities. 113 Organizational Learning
Organizational knowledge resides in the rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies around which organizations are structured and how they operate. 114 It becomes part of collective memory. 115 Organizations acquire information through networks, alliances, or partnerships and intelligent failures that provide important diagnostic information. 116 Learning organizations are well-positioned to innovate.
Conditions that support intelligent failures and organizational learning include a focus on process, acceptance or legitimization of failure (such as leadership willing to learn from mistakes and not punish risk taking), publicizing or acknowledging intelligent failures, training for resilience, committing resources to efforts with uncertain outcomes, and incorporating problem solving into the organization's philosophy or ideology. 117 EXAMPLE: The Provisional Irish Republican Army has been described as having a "culture of learning," which included the preemployment testing of weapons systems, willingness to innovate, and institutionalization of after-action analyses of successful and failed bombing attacks (for example, gathering post-attack information on unexploded ordnance through observers stationed at police barriers 
Social Frames Support the Use of CB Weapons
Framing refers to social influence on how individuals perceive or interpret and react to an object or event. 119 Perception of the same event can vary considerably depending on the frame in which the event is set. For example, a story about police arresting protesters framed by concerns for 117 Based on a recently compiled dataset of incidents of failed and foiled (outside intervention) jihadist attempts since 1993 to attack the United States and its Western allies, Crenshaw (2016) observed that terrorists may sometimes perceive a failed or foiled plot as being successful. Although data do not exist on whether failed or foiled attempts were treated by jihadist groups as intelligent failures and part of organizational learning, the compiled dataset may contain additional information on whether and which groups have other characteristics of a learning organization. the protest turning violent will be perceived differently (more favorably) than if the arrests are framed as an example of overly aggressive police tactics (less favorably).
Social framing by political, insurgent, and terrorist groups can help justify a group's ideology or behavior and suggest possible responses to an event. 120 Exposure to internal propaganda, communications from trusted others, social media, and the internet can tap deeply held beliefs, increase awareness of alternative weapons, tactics, and techniques, and communicate direct and subtle messages of acceptable or preferred weapons to use against enemies. 121 Groups may also stage unconventional activities (for example, ISIS videos of the beheading of hostages) or employ new technologies to increase media exposure, create propaganda for use in recruiting or training, or prompt others to emulate their actions. Social frames used by a group to radicalize others may influence lone wolf attackers who profess allegiance to a terrorist group.
Within social movements, activists use frames to present themselves and their ideas to gain the support of others. 122 Frames can convince others that their participation is necessary for change to occur. 123 They can also "highlight specific societal problems and identify the parties guilty of creating them." 124 Frames involving CBW can demonstrate how to initiate specific change that solves problems.
EXAMPLE: Islamic imagery on websites has included combinations of weapons including gas masks to suggest the use or potential use of chemical or biological weapons to achieve objectives or in retaliation for use by the adversary (see Figure 2 ). 125 Figure Some qualitative terrorism analysis has supported the view that groups with certain types of ideology are more likely than other groups to engage in extreme violence or use unconventional weapons. 133 Hoffman has observed that religion may be used to legitimize violence against opponents. 134 Other research, however, suggests that ideology may contribute much less in predicting whether a particular group may use WMD and, specifically, CBW. 135 Whether and how group ideology, values, and goals is related to the use and method of violence remains an empirical question which requires a more granular analysis. Nonetheless, ideology, values, and goals can provide insights into whether a group presented with an opportunity to acquire or use CBW would take advantage of it.
A group's ideology functions partly as an indicant of the group's identity ("this is who we are") and is important for group loyalty, cohesion, acceptance of group norms, and in the selection of potential allies or partners. 136 Group members who are committed to the group's ideology and values may also be more committed to accomplishing the group's tasks even if it requires violence. 137 Group leaders whose beliefs and values support the use of CBW in attacks against the group's targets can affect member acceptance through the strength of their influence over the group, through selective rewarding of violent behavior, and with social frames that support CBW use. However, groups may resist or reject outright weapons or tactics innovations that are not consistent with a group's ideology. 138 Because research has not sufficiently addressed the relationship between a group's ideology and the use of CBW, this indicator is a topic for future research. Importantly, the level of analysis must distinguish among the ideologies of specific groups. The question is not whether groups with religious ideologies are more likely to use violence or CBW, but rather what about religious (or other) ideologies will influence a group's actions.
EXAMPLES: Aum Shinrikyo's ideology included belief in an apocalyptic war, which the cult would survive only by arming itself with "powerful weapons including biological and chemical agents." 139 The ideologies, values, and beliefs of groups such as al Qaeda, The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, Hamas, and Jemaah al Islamiyah support or are interpreted to support or justify the use of violence to defend against and defeat perceived enemies. 140 Application and Future Research
The conceptual model of CBW intent described in this article is the basis for a computational CBW model which analysts can test and apply. 141 The development and evaluation of the computational model is a critical next step for our research program in CBW. Once in computational form, the conceptual CBW Intent Model can be empirically evaluated as a statistical model for the existence and strength of proposed relationships. 142 With sufficient data, interactions among the identified indicators can also be evaluated. Formal elicitation from experts leading to quantitative data is also available to inform the computational model. 143 Testing the application of the computational CBW model will use readily available, processed data, such as those from the University of Maryland START Center, historical summaries, and news reporting on groups of interest. 144 Because parts of the conceptual model correspond with activities that occur more frequently than the use of CBW (for example, general political violence), it is expected that some parts of the model will be more precisely calibrated than others. Once the computational model is developed, it can be used for multiple purposes. First is to identify and prioritize indicators to monitor or track intent to use CBW in groups. Second, the computational model can be used to quantify the status of tracked groups on each indicator to determine their risk for violent acts and use of CBW. Finally, the computational model can be used to track changes in group status on all indicators to identify change in risk.
Given the potentially large amount of information analysts review daily, it is impractical to expect anyone to apply the model as part of daily information review without additional assistance. To that end, the computational CBW model will be incorporated into a model-based analysis software system to address both the scale of the data and the complexity of the model. As information related with CBW intent is collected, the envisioned computational framework will support computational evaluations of the CBW model. Questions to address will include whether there are detectable regional variations in the expression of CBW intent, and how well the CBW Intent Model-developed considering non-state actors-captures state actors' intent regarding use of violence and CBW. The framework for the conceptual CBW Intent Model and the approach for developing, testing, and using the computational model map to other settings. Potential applications include general political violence, terrorism, and intent of non-state actors to use radiological and nuclear WMD.
While the model incorporates indicators for the most important factors related to interest and intent to use CBW, we may test other indicators in the future to determine their contribution to predicting intent. Future research should also include model validation using data sets and case studies of a large number and variety of groups. Ideally, the groups should vary across factors that can affect group or organizational decisions related to size, maturity, structure, founding member beliefs and values, primary objectives for existence, membership, leadership, stakeholder influence, and geographical location. 145
